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Abstract—In a number of information security scenarios,
human beings can be better than technical security measures
at detecting threats. This is particularly the case when a threat
is based on deception of the user rather than exploitation of a
specific technical flaw, as is the case of spear-phishing, application
spoofing, multimedia masquerading and other semantic social
engineering attacks. Here, we put the concept of the human-
as-a-security-sensor to the test with a first case study on a
small number of participants subjected to different attacks
in a controlled laboratory environment and provided with a
mechanism to report these attacks if they spot them. A key
challenge is to estimate the reliability of each report, which we
address with a machine learning approach. For comparison, we
evaluate the ability of known technical security countermeasures
in detecting the same threats. This initial proof of concept study
shows that the concept is viable.
Keywords—Human-as-a-Sensor, social engineering, semantic
attacks, cyber security.
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a growing realisation in the security industry that
the users need to be at the core of any systems security design
[1]–[6]. Our aim is to progress a step further and empower
users to directly contribute to the security of themselves, their
organisation or the wider community actively. For the detection
of semantic social engineering attacks, users require an inter-
face that provides them with functionality to report suspicious
or anomalous activity that uses deceptive attack vectors rather
than technical exploitations; for which the human user often is
a more accurate sensor than an organisations technical security
systems.
The aim of Human-as-a-Security-Sensor (HaaSS), and in-
deed most user-driven defences, is not to replace technical
security systems, especially those that have been shown to
work well in detecting and mitigating certain semantic attacks
(e.g., phishing websites [7]), but to enhance or complement
them by leveraging human sensing capacity and experience.
More specifically, HaaSS can be used to actively augment
existing technical defence mechanisms by combining telemetry
generated by user threat detection with threats flagged by
technical defence platforms; helping confirm the existence and
highlight the extent of the threat, or crucially, for detecting
semantic attacks that have been largely undetectable by tech-
nical systems. In this capacity, HaaSS allows for proactive
and preemptive detection of semantic attacks by positioning
(and empowering) the user as a platform security sensor in
order to identify and report suspected attacks in real-time.
To add clarity to the function of HaaSS in the context of
semantic attacks and the wider computer security threat space,
we propose the following definition:
Human-as-a-Security-Sensor. The paradigm of leveraging
the ability of human users to act as sensors that can detect
and report information security threats.
In this work we take the first steps towards exploring
the applicability of the HaaSS concept for semantic attack
detection within the context of active threat scanning (where
sensors are purposely searching for the presence of threats),
by testing the reliability of human users as security sensors in
a laboratory-based experiment with Cogni-Sense; a proof of
concept HaaSS platform.
II. RELATED WORK
The human as a sensor paradigm has been deployed in
a number of scenarios and contexts related the detection
of physical threats, such as unfolding emergencies [8], or
adverse physical conditions related to noise pollution [9]. The
extension of this concept, which positions human computer
users as physical sensors of cyber attacks, and in this specific
case semantic attacks, is relatively new. Stembert et al. [10]
have recently proposed combining a reporting function with
blocking and warning of suspicious emails and the provision
of educative tips, so as to harness the intelligence of expert
and novice users in detecting email phishing attacks in a
corporate environment. Initial experimental results of their
mock-up have been encouraging for the applicability of the
human as a security sensor concept in this context. Another
recent example of utilising the concept was demonstrated by
Malisa et al. [11] where the researchers developed an accurate
and automated mobile application spoofing detection system
by leveraging user visual similarity perception; integrating the
human sensing data collected as an integral component of the
technical systems detection decision making. To detect seman-
tic attacks with some accuracy, both systems utilise explicitly
user expertise and knowledge, but there is no exploration
or measurement of what determines the users’ performance
as security sensors. By establishing such insight, a technical
system could highlight the key attributes associated to user
Fig. 1: Human-as-as-Security-Sensor defence model
threat detection and as a result improve system performance
by recognising which threat reports are more credible.
An experimental study conducted by Heartfield et al.
demonstrated that the reliability of a users attack reporting
depends on their activity profile, as defined by characteristics,
such as the amount and type of security training, familiarity
with each system, frequency and duration of system access
etc. [12], [13]. The profile also serves to define one’s predicted
susceptibility to semantic attacks. However, before building a
system that depends extensively on a particular type of sensor
(and the human sensor is no exception), one needs to be able
to measure or estimate its overall reliability. In the case of
HaaSS, this requires expanding upon theoretical observations
made under survey or questionnaire conditions [14].
Here, we take the first steps in evaluating HaaSS per-
formance by first measuring participants’ detection efficacy
profiles and then testing their ability to detect semantic attacks
in an interactive laboratory environment using a specifically
developed reporting mechanism. Furthermore, using the same
attacks, we evaluate HaaSS comparatively with existing tech-
nical defence systems, which claim to provide technology to
protect users against phishing and social engineering.
III. Cogni-Sense: A PROTOTYPE HAASS SYSTEM
To leverage human user capacity for deception-based threat
detection, it is first important to establish a systematic process
for modelling HaaSS attack detection, classification and secu-
rity enforcement. In Figure 1, we follow a conventional and
well established technical defence approach [15] to describe a
HaaSS defence model as a series of discrete system processes.
In process 1, users form a HaaSS defence systems edge sensor
detection mechanism, where threat exposure on different plat-
forms user interfaces trigger attack detection and reporting.
In this sensor component, HaaSS detection efficacy features
are collected according to the user activity profile. Process
2 classifies received reports (as correctly detected attacks
or not) and uses the HaaSS features to compute a HaaSS
score which indicates the sensors expected reliability for the
specific report. The HaaSS score is discussed in section III-A.
In the classification process, if this score exceeds a defined
threshold, the report is automatically assigned an action or sent
to a sandbox for manual review. In both cases, after report
classification, process 3 enforces a defence response which
results in execution of security enforcing rules (e.g., blocking
a website URL, or adding an email domain to spam lists) to
deal with confirmed threats.
Fig. 2: Overview of Cogni-Sense technical architecture
ID Plat. Component Description
1 Users Cogni-app Python app monitoring user platform ac-
tivity and attack report interface with
HTTP connectivity to the Cogni-Sense
cloud platform
2 Cloud H engine R engine with Random Forest HaaSS
Score prediction model producing a de-
tection probability output for report clas-
sification
2 Cloud Report portal Apache PHP web server with MYSQL
back-end for storing HaaSS reports and
features, also provides a screenshot based
sandbox for manual report review and
classification
3 Both SEM interface Python interface to execute security rule
enforcement on external defence platforms
(currently integrated with SMTP server for
sending attack awareness reports to HaaSS
sensors)
TABLE I: Summary of major Cogni-Sense system components
- ID refers to the associated process element as defined in
Figure 1
Using the above process-driven model, we have devel-
oped a prototype HaaSS platform called Cogni-Sense. The
prototype’s technical architecture is shown in Figure 2, where
each of the coloured boxes within the architecture refers
to a component’s functional role within the overall HaaSS
defence process, as shown in Figure 1. By combining each
of the system processes into a technical system, Cogni-Sense
provides a user with a practical facility to report suspected
attacks, where credible reports are then utilised to implement
tangible defences against identified threats. Table I summaries
the technical components within Cogni-Sense with high-level
description of their functionality. Within the system itself,
detection, classification and security response are coordinated
between Python middleware which provides communication
between different components of the system, including a
MySQL database which stores all HaaSS profile and report
data, an R engine with the Random Forest HaaSS score model,
an Apache PHP web-server which hosts the HaaSS report
portal and sandbox and external security platform connectivity.
Feature Variable Format
Familiarity with platform Not very, somewhat, very
Frequency of platform use Never, <1x a month, 1x month, weekly, daily
Duration of platform use None, <30 min, 30 min-1h, 1-2h, 2-4h, >4h
Time since ST (platform) Never, >1y, ≤1y, ≤6m, ≤3m, ≤1m, ≤2w
Familiarity with plat. type Not very, somewhat, very
Freq. of plat. type use Never, <1x a month, 1x month, weekly, daily
Dur. of platform type use None, <30min, 30min-1h, 1-2h, 2-4h, >4h
Time since ST (plat. type) Never, >1y, ≤1y, ≤6m, ≤3m, ≤1m, ≤2w
Time since ST (formal edu.) Never, >1y, ≤1y, ≤6m, ≤3m, ≤1m, ≤2w
ST formal edu. (coursework) No, Yes
Time since ST (at work) Never, >1y, ≤1y, ≤6m, ≤3m, ≤1m, ≤2w
ST at work (videos) No, Yes
ST Work-based (games) No, Yes
Time since ST (self-study) Never, >1y, ≤1y, ≤6m, ≤3m, ≤1m, ≤2w
ST self-study (websites) No, Yes
ST self-study (videos) No, Yes
ST = Infosec training, edu= education, y = year, m = month, w = week
TABLE II: Random Forest Susceptibility model HaaSS fea-
tures used to compute HaaSS Score H
A. Predicting Sensor Reliability: The HaaSS Score
To determine the credibility of semantic attack reports,
Cogni-Sense utilises a semantic attack susceptibility model,
based on a Random Forest machine learning algorithm, which
has been developed and trained from experiments by Heartfield
et al. in [12], which identified key features associated to
susceptibility to semantic attacks. This susceptibility model
has been directly integrated into the technical implementation
of the HaaSS report classification process in Cogni-Sense.
The susceptibility model facilitates classification of HaaSS
report detection accuracy (to confirm a report as an attack or
not) by analysing users’ computer usage and activity profiles
in order to predict their expected detection efficacy when
reporting suspected attacks on specific platforms. Here, the
model’s specific features, which were identified as indicators
of semantic attack susceptibility (and therefore attack detection
efficacy), are summarised in Table II. Random Forest is a
machine learning algorithm that functions as an ensemble of
decision trees which evaluates the class association (here attack
report Vs. not an attack report) of a set of random variables in
a feature-set. The outcome of a trained Random Forest is a set
of n decisions trees with fixed decision points that have been
selected as part of the training process, where if a particular
pattern of feature value inputs are observed will produce a
Fig. 3: The Cogni-Sense HaaSS reporting app icon running in
system tray. When clicked, a reporting window is opened with
the detected platform and report information
prediction outcome that follows these fixed decision points.
The model can operate in two modes, strict classification or
class probability. As strict classification is sensitive to false
positive and false negative output, which in practice would
result in the discarding of accurate reports or nugatory time
spent reviewing non-attack reports, Cogni-Sense utilises a
class probability mode output for prediction user detection
efficacy; producing a probability metric of instead of direct
classification (e.g., 0 or 1). Using this approach, the probability
metric provides a key facility to prioritise user reports which
are most likely to be credible semantic social engineering
attacks. We refer to this probability metric as the HaaSS (H)
score. This score serves to inform the Cogni-Sense system
of a HaaSS report’s reliability based on the reporting user.
Moreover, this metric is also intended to aid the optimisation
of resources for investigating and mitigating credible threats
(either automatically based on a trusted H score threshold or
via a security operations engineer), with the aim to reduce the
effective time period of semantic attack exposure and potential
exploitation for system users. Here, prioritisation assumes that
the higher the score (i.e., probability) the more likely that a
report contains a correctly identified attack.
In the following experiment, we evaluate two major com-
ponents of Cogni-Sense: (a) the HaaSS sensor semantic attack
detection reporting mechanism Cogni-app, installed on the
participant experiment environment, as shown in Figure 3, and
(b) the viability of the HaaSS score prediction as a utility
to determine accurately HaaSS attack detection efficacy com-
pared with a range of technical security platforms which claim
to enforce anti-social engineering defences against different
semantic attacks. Due to the role-play constraints of the re-
mote, laboratory-based experiment environment, participants’
HaaSS features were imported manually in the Cogni-Sense
system. In this experiment, we did not use or evaluate the
ID Security Platform Platform Type Phishing Web Rating URL blocking Heuristics On-access malware
E1 Yahoo Mail Email 3 7 3 7 3
E2 Gmail Email 3 7 3 7 3
E3 Outlook Email 3 7 3 7 3
E4 ProtonMail Email 3 7 3 7 3
E5 Yandex Email 3 7 3 7 3
E6 GMX Email 3 7 3 7 3
E7 mail.com Email 3 7 3 7 3
B1 Firefox Browser 3 3 3 7 3
B2 Chrome Browser 3 3 3 7 3
B3 Opera Browser 3 3 3 7 3
B4 Commodo Dragon Browser 3 3 3 7 3
B5 Avast Safezone Browser 3 3 3 7 3
B6 Microsoft Edge Browser 3 3 3 7 3
B7 Safari Browser 3 3 3 7 3
A1 Commodo Cloud AV 3 7 3 3 3
A2 AVG AntiVirus AV 3 7 3 3 3
A3 Avast AntiVirus AV 3 7 3 7 3
A4 Windows Defender AV 3 7 3 3 3
A5 Norton Security AV 3 3 3 3 3
A6 Kaspersky Internet Security AV 3 3 3 3 3
A7 Sophos Intercept X AV 3 3 3 3 3
P1 Facebook Platform 3 7 3 7 7
P2 GoogleDrive Platform 3 7 7 7 3
P3 Windows10 OS 7 7 7 7 7
TABLE III: Technical security platforms with built-in anti-phishing, anti-malware functionality tested against laboratory semantic
social engineering attacks
automatic HaaSS feature collection functionality developed in
Cogni-Sense. This is because participants spent an average of
thirty minutes attempting to detect attacks, where insufficient
learning time was available to collect HaaSS feature data
automatically. We do, however, evaluate the functionality of
security enforcement module (SEM) integration attack classifi-
cation e-mail alerting (shown in Figure 6), which was triggered
by conducting manual classification on a semantic attack report
received by HaaSS sensor 5 (H5 - experiment ID 15) during
the experiment. Participants did not have access to the cloud-
based Cogni-Sense portal during or after the experiment and
were unaware of reports made by other participants during the
experiment.
IV. HAASS VS. TECHNICAL DEFENCES FOR DETECTION
OF SEMANTIC ATTACKS: THE CASE OF SELINA CARLYSLE
In the following experiment, we directly compare the
detection capabilities of a group of participants acting as
HaaSS sensors against a range of technical defences which
claim to enforce anti-social engineering technologies against a
range of different semantic attacks.
A. Experimental environment
The experimental environment was presented in the form
of a Windows 10 virtual machine which each participant
could remotely access via TeamViewer. The task was a role-
play exercise in the form of “a day in the life of Selina
Carlyle” (an imaginary freelance artist), where all participants
conducted a number of computer-based activities that Selina
would typically carry out as part of her computer usage. This
involved checking her email on Gmail, accessing Facebook
and reading messages, notifications, as well accessing other
platforms such as Twitter, Pinterest and general web browsing
for artwork. In the case of Twitter, Pinterest and web browsing,
these were designed as noise activities to prevent participants
from presuming that all attacks would reside within Gmail or
Facebook.
In total, seven participants were recruited for the exper-
iment as HaaSS sensors by inviting a number of computer
science students, lecturers and the general public to complete
a questionnaire related to the experiment’s purpose and their
computer activity profile. The questionnaire described the role-
play scenario, the goal of reporting detected attacks using the
Cogni-Sense app, and collected offline the required HaaSS
features for computing the H score of each participant with the
Random Forest susceptibility model. Each of the participants
were assigned a HaaSS sensor number and reporting user
ID to match reports to corresponding HaaSS sensors in the
experiment. Participants were given also a user guide on
how to use the Cogni-Sense reporting tool (Figure 3) when
detecting a suspected semantic social engineering attack. The
same Windows 10 virtual machine environment was also used
to install and test individually each of the technical defence
platforms against each of the semantic attacks. In table III, each
of the technical platforms and defence systems listed is eval-
uated according to their individual functional capabilities for
detecting semantic attacks. Whilst email and browser platforms
tend to offer anti-phishing, URL filtering and anti-malware
defence, they do not directly employ heuristic scanning as part
of this functionality, which as shown, is exclusively provided
by the anti-virus software that we have evaluated. This means
that in practice, most email providers rely on signature-based
attack recognition for email by query through registered attack
databases.
B. Zero-day semantic social engineering attacks
The vast majority of semantic social engineering attacks
are largely undetectable by technical defence systems, because
they primarily rely on cosmetic or behavioural deception
vectors and as a result often leave very small technical
footprint that can be analysed, especially if the deception
has been designed to utilise intended user functionality [16].
Consequently, technical heuristic detection capabilities have a
limited view of potential attack vectors through user actions,
instead of system interfacing malware. In most cases, technical
Attack Emulated Attack Depend. Description
1.1 Spear Phishing Email - Targeted participant email advertising job role specific to their profile
from fake recruitment company with URL to purported job description
PDF document on Google drive
1.2 Cloud Storage File Masquerading 1.1 Malware HTA file masquerading as PDF in online Google Drive folder
2.1 IM Phishing - Unsolicited Facebook message containing Facebook page link
2.2 Multimedia masquerading 2.1 Malicious image link masquerading as Facebook video post
3.1 Phishing Email - Order confirmation email from Amazon with order details and tracking
URLs leading to phishing Amazon login web page
3.2 Phishing website 3.1 Amazon login phishing website which captures user login details
TABLE IV: Experiment emulated semantic attacks sent to participants with indicated date and time at which the attacks were
launched for all participants (this does not guarantee that participants were exposed to the attacks at the time of launch)
defence systems rely on attack reports before they can develop
signatures that can be matched against similar patterns when
analysing potential threats, or attempting to pre-empt them.
For example, it is difficult to characterise a website as
phishing if the URL is not registered with a spam database,
and does not use obvious tricks such as similar domains names
used as sub-domains, obfuscated by domain suffixes which
are not related to the masqueraded website (e.g., amazon.net-
shopping.tk). In cases where a phishing website name orig-
inates from a legitimate and credible service provider (and
does not attempt to obfuscate its appearance), until the website
has been reported as malicious (or contains easily identifiable
malicious code or web re-directions in the web page), most
technical defence platforms will not recognise the website
as phishing. The same example can be seen in spam emails
where spam protection mechanisms analyse components such
as sender from and to address, subject title, domain, hyperlinks,
attachments, salutation and common phrases (e.g., urgency) as
to match known common patterns phishing attacks. However,
if the email body consisted purely of a deceptive image
from a domain name not in a black list, then the classifiers
effectiveness is significantly reduced, as a spam protection is
unlikely to interpret the visual information in the image.
For technical defence systems to stand a chance in detect-
ing unknown semantic attacks, defence mechanisms require
the ability to interpret visual and behavioural attributes in
real-time to predict the likeliness that a deception attempt is
occurring - which without knowing the user or integration
with the platform would likely result in many false-positives
or false-negatives. On the other-hand, users, by definition, are
implicitly interfaced with such attributes and are therefore best
placed to decide whether system activity on the user interface
is anomalous or not, based on their experience and knowledge.
As each of the attacks exposed to users and technical defences
were developed specifically for this experiment, and therefore
have not been seen by technical defence systems or users
before, they are assumed to be zero-day semantic social
engineering attacks in this case.
In this study, we aim to evaluate the detection efficacy
of HaaSS sensors for identifying zero-day semantic social
engineering attacks over technical defence systems, in order
to show the potential usefulness of the HaaSS concept for
detecting deception-based threats. Each of the attacks in the
experiment are described in Table IV.
C. Experimental Results
In Table V, we compare the experimental results for
the HaaSS participants and each of the technical platforms
for detecting the semantic attacks in Table IV. The spear-
phishing email in attack 1.1 proved the most challenging
one to detect for HaaSS participants, with only three out of
seven participants correctly reporting the email as an attack.
However, three out of four of the HaaSS sensors who were
exploited by the email by clicking on the GoogleDrive link,
then detected the malicious HTML application file in Google
drive afterwards (attack 2.2). The H score prediction at a
probability threshold of 50% threshold was only 43% accurate,
but at a 65% threshold, it was 86% accurate, with a 100% true
positive rate and false positive rate of 25%. By comparison
only two out of the seven email providers, Yandex and Yahoo
mail, sent the email to spam, with all others placing the email
in the inbox folder with no warnings of a suspected attack.
With the exception of Firefox (B1) and Windows 10 (P3),
which prompted the user that they were downloading/running
an executable file; Commodo Cloud AV (A1) also ran the
downloaded file in a sandbox as a default action of the software
because it was an unknown file. All other browsers and
antivirus packages failed to detect the email or subsequent file
in GoogleDrive (in the online platform or when downloaded
and run) as malicious; with no user warnings at all.
For the IM phishing message (attack 2.1) on Facebook
only three out of seven HaaSS sensors were actually exposed
to the semantic attack, as the message originated from an
account which was not a Facebook friend of the Selina persona.
This meant that the message was placed under Facebook
“message requests” which is more hidden than friend based
messages or profile notifications. For the three HaaSS sensors
that were exposed, all three clicked on the link in the message,
which was included as an image hyperlink leading to another
Facebook page. At this point during the technical testing, no
technical defences (including the Facebook platform itself) had
flagged the message as malicious or anomalous. Even though
all three HaaSS sensors were exposed to the video masquerad-
ing images on the fake Facebook charity page (attack 2.2),
none of the users actually clicked on the image, but they also
failed to report it as a semantic attack. Again, none of the
technical defences and the Facebook platform itself detected
HaaSS Email Prov. Browsers AntiVirus Platform
Attack H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 H7 E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 P1 P2 P3
1.1 .68 .92 .61 .77 .64 .61 .78 7 7 3 7 3 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 - - 7
1.2 .66 .87 .49 .19 .77 .52 .76 - - - - - - - 3 7 7 7 7 7 7 3 7 7 7 7 7 7 - 7 3
2.1 .78 .85 .64 .90 .74 .23 .84 - - - - - - - 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 - 7
2.2 .78 .85 .64 .90 .74 .23 .84 - - - - - - - 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 - 7
3.1 .68 .92 .61 .77 .64 .61 .78 7 7 3 7 3 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 - - 7
3.2 .68 .79 .53 .46 .54 .57 .75 - - - - - - - 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 - - 7
TABLE V: HaaSS and Technical experiment attack detection results. The number refers to the HaaSS score H , (e.g., probability
of detection). The colour refers to detection result: red - not detected, green - detected, orange - precautionary measure taken,
but no threat reported, grey - attack not seen.
Fig. 4: Attack 3.2 (Amazon login phishing website) Cogni-
Sense portal report screenshot for HaaSS report by H5
the image as malicious (which was expected given the fact
that the image was simply using the in-built Facebook image
hyperlink functionality and posing as a video using cosmetic
features in the image). Here, the H score predicted that the
three users exposed to the threat would detect it, however given
the lack of exposure to the threat in a realistic context (e.g.,
participants’ own personal accounts), it is unclear whether the
actual response is robust enough to discount the prediction of
the H score.
For the Amazon phishing email (attack 3.1), six out of
seven HaaSS sensors detected the attack, whereas only Yandex
email provider sent the email to spam; Yahoo email blocked
the email’s images but did not flag the email as malicious. All
other technical defences failed to identify the email as a threat
or provide any warnings. The HaaSS score correctly predicted
six out of seven HaaSS detections at the 50% threshold, but
would only have detected four out of seven correctly at the
65% threshold. The one HaaSS sensor that was exploited by
clicking on the link in the Amazon phishing email, then cor-
rectly detected the following Amazon phishing login webpage
- an action correctly predicted by the participant’s HaaSS
score. Again, all technical defences and platforms failed to
detect the phishing website as malicious.
Overall, the HaaSS sensors were more efficient at detecting
all threats than the technical defences exposed to the semantic
attacks - without prior knowledge of the attacks themselves or
any training provided prior to this experiment. By comparison,
the technical defences in almost all cases failed to detect the
existence of a threat. Surprisingly, Yahoo detected the spear
phishing email as spam, but not the Amazon email which
used a header alias to look as if the email originated from
Amazon. An example a HaaSS detection result for attack 3.1
is shown in Figure 4 and 5, which is the screen capture of the
users screen made by the Cogni-Sense reporting app (which is
sent to the cloud portal) and the accompanying report details
showing the computed HaaSS score for the report, time and
date when the report was made and the HaaSS sensor report
observation details. From a classification perspective, HaaSS
was 68% accurate at a 50% probability threshold with a true
positive rate of 93% and true negative rate of 43%, precision
of 62%, false positive rate of 57% and false negative rate of
7%. However, at the 65% probability threshold, it achieved an
accuracy of 64% with a true positive rate of 67%, true negative
rate of 6%, precision of 67%, false positive rate of 4% and false
negative rate of 33%. Where the HaaSS score was shown to be
the same value for consecutive attacks on the same platform
(e.g., email on Gmail, social media on Facebook), this is due to
the report and classification processes occurring in essentially
the same time period, with the same feature set.
In the case of organisational HaaSS defence, if these partic-
ipants were HaaSS sensors in a security platform, prioritising
these reports based on the HaaSS score probability results in
the experiment would ensure almost all of the attacks would be
identified before reviewing a non-attack report. Furthermore,
by utilising such HaaSS sensors, an organisations security
platform would indeed detect the semantic attacks in the first
place, which, as we have demonstrated, is unlikely to be the
case if they were to rely purely on the types of technical
defences evaluated in this experiment.
D. Limitations
In our laboratory-based experiment, there are a few lim-
itations that must be considered. Overall, the experiments
were taken in a very controlled environment which could
have an effect on the detection efficacy of HaaSS sensors
compared to their performance in a more realistic scenario. For
example, participants were primed to the purpose of the role-
play experiment, and such may have been more vigilant and
Fig. 5: Attack 3.2 (Amazon login phishing website) Cogni-
Sense portal report description for HaaSS report by H5,
classified as a semantic attack
sensitive to each of the deception vectors than they would have
normally been; and this may have weakened an attack’s effect.
Conversely, as the experiment involved role-play, this may have
also reduced participants’ ability to determine whether certain
attack interactions were contextually anomalous (e.g., Amazon
order confirmation). Nevertheless, in direct comparison with
the operation of technical defence systems, a HaaSS sensor in
practice can be purposely employed solely to search for the
existence of semantic social engineering attacks in a contin-
uous “online” fashion as part of a security platform within
an organisation (which is analogous to a security operations
centre continuously monitoring a network traffic security feed
for anomalies) or remote paid service (e.g., cloud-based HaaSS
reporting). From this perspective, it would be assumed that
a HaaSS sensor is constantly vigilant and therefore actively
searching for semantic attacks on platforms that are accessed.
In respect to the experiment itself, limitations were also
shown in the evaluation of HaaSS against semantic attacks
2.1 and 2.2 (Facebook IM phishing and video masquerading),
due to participants not being exposed to the attack or simply
missing it. In practice, it is still unclear how effective such
attacks would be, and therefore it is important to investigate
this more robustly in future work.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have put the HaaSS paradigm to the
test with a first case study in semantic social engineering
attacks, and compared against technical platforms that claim
to provide defence against such attacks as well as technical
defence systems designed to protect specifically from them.
In this respect, this first evaluation was successful, as the
users performed considerably better than all technical defence
systems, and the Cogni-Sense application developed for lever-
aging this ability of users proved fit for the purpose. One of
its most important contributions is that it allows not only to
capture HaaSS reports but also to score them according to the
Fig. 6: Cogni-Sense HaaSS report semantic attack classification
for report by H5, triggering SEM module rule: attack aware-
ness email security enforcing function rule
estimated reliability of the users that generated them. In future
work, we will evaluate Cogni-Sense in a real-world and more
extensive experiment, featuring automated collection of user
activity features, as well as automated security enforcement
based on the reports’ HaaSS scores. Furthermore, in future
development Cogni-Sense will be expanded to mobile devices
and the Internet of Things in order to utilise HaaSS holistically
across a wide range of future user-computer interfaces.
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